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Acquisition of Technology from a Foreign 
Government 
by Laurence S. Fedak* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology developed by foreign governments and their domestic firms will 
play an increasing role in U.S. defense policy. Japan, for example, is aggressively 
developing advanced technologies for commercial application in the computer 
science field, and many of their improvements will have significant defense 
related applications. As other allied nations develop similar capabilities, it will be 
in our common interest to acquire their technology for defense-related pur-
poses. 
One way of obtaining needed non-domestic technology is through an execu-
tive agreement! concluded by the U.S. government with a foreign government 
acting either on its own behalf, when it has the legal right to transfer the 
technology, or on behalf of the foreign corporation that owns the technology. 
The primary emphasis in this paper is on the latter situation, where a non-U.S. 
business entity owns the technology and is willing to transfer the data, through 
its government, to the U.S. government in exchange for appropriate compensa-
tion. 
The discussion of executive agreement transfers of technology will be devel-
oped in two separate areas. First, the basic statutory and regulatory underpin-
ning for the executive agreement will be examined. Once the authority for the 
agreement is established, acquisition issues will be reviewed with special em-
phasis on audit rights and contractual provisions. The basic theme of this paper 
is that the executive agreement acquiring foreign technology (or foreign defense 
supplies or services) must comply with the procedural requirements for conclud-
ing an international agreement, and the substantive authority for acquiring such 
technology arises from the procurement statutes and regulations. 
* Attorney in the Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Air Force. The views expressed 
herein are solely those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of the 
Air Force, Department of Defense. or any other agency of the U.S. government. 
1. An "executive agreement" is an international agreement concluded by the executive branch of the 
United States government with a foreign government or international organization without reference 
to a treaty or act of Congress. 
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II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE USE OF EXECUTIVE 
AGREEMENTS FOR PROCUREMENT 
A. Authority for Executive Agreements 
An international agreement may have one of several possible titles, such as 
treaty, convention, protocol, declaration, agreement, act, covenant, statute, char-
ter, or memorandum of understanding. An executive agreement is a specific 
authorized representation of the executive branch without Senate ratification.2 
When the objective or purpose of an executive agreement is the acquisition or 
purchase of foreign technology, the agreement will be referred to as an execu-
tive agreement acquisition (EAA). An EAA is an international agreement con-
cluded by the executive branch of the U.S. government, as purchaser, with a 
foreign government, as seller, for the acquisition of non-U .S. technology for use 
by U.S. defense forces. The actual transferor of the technology will be, in most 
cases, a subcontractor located in a foreign country. 
B. Relationship of an Executive Agreement to Procurement Statutes 
One of the basic concepts involved in the purchase of foreign technology 
through the use of an executive agreement is the necessity for specific legal 
authority supporting every commitment undertaken in the executive agreement. 
Consequently, if an executive department wants to purchase technology or some 
other type of product or service from a foreign source through the use of an 
EAA, it must have specific legal authority to commit the United States to such a 
purchase. Executive agreements, however, do not provide the required substan-
tive authority. 3 
The necessity for establishing substantive legal authority is well recognized by 
the Department of Defense. For example, prior to concluding an international 
agreement, the DOD component must request approval of the document. The 
need for separate legal authority is also clearly reflected in paragraph H of DOD 
Directive 5530.3, which requires the request for approval to be accompanied by 
the draft text of the agreement and: 
(b) A legal memorandum containing the constitutional, statutory, 
or other legal authority available to carry out each obligation 
proposed to be assumed by the United States in the agreement, 
as well as an explanation of other relevant legal considerations; 
and 
(c) A fiscal memorandum that sets forth the estimated cost of each 
obligation proposed to be assumed by the Department of De-
2. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1975). 
3. See DOD Directive 5530.3, para. H (December 9, 1979). 
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fense in the agreement, the source of funds to be obligated or a 
statement that additional funds for the purpose will be requested 
for a specified fiscal year(s). 
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The authority to enter into contracts for the acquisition of defense supplies 
and services is contained in the basic congressional grants of authority to the 
Department of Defense, the military departments, and the defense agencies. In 
addition, the annual authorization and appropriation acts provide congressional 
approval and funding for the activities of the military departments. The basic 
procedures used by the Department of Defense to acquire supplies or services 
are found in The Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as amended, Title 
10, chapter 137. More specifically, 10 U.S.C. § 2303 states that chapter 137 
applies to the "purchase of or contract to purchase property or services for which 
payment is to be made from appropriated funds." Acquisition of foreign tech-
nology falls in this category. 
To implement the authority granted to the defense establishment, the Secre-
tary of Defense has been authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 2202 to issue regulations 
which govern defense procurement. This authority was delegated by the Secre-
tary of Defense, through the Department of Defense Directive 5126.22, dated 
March 25, 1975, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logis-
tics) who issues the Defense Acquisition Regulation (formerly known as the 
Armed Services Procurement Regulation). The Defense Acquisition Regulation 
(DAR) establishes the detailed policies and procedures utilized by the military 
departments in acquiring property and services. The DAR, however, was re-
cently replaced by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the DOD FAR 
Supplement. References in this paper, however, will be to the DAR. 
It is reasonably clear that the basic organic statutes creating the departments, 
the annual congressional authorization and appropriation of funds, and the 
DAR can provide the specific, substantive legal authority necessary to support 
procurement obligations and commitments contained in an EAA. Since the 
procedural requirements contained in chapter 137 apply to the procurement 
commitments contained in the EAA, then the standard DAR policies and provi-
sions will apply unless deviations are granted by an appropriate authority. As a 
general proposition, a blanket waiver of all nonstatutory DAR requirements 
should be considered whenever an EAA must be negotiated with a foreign 
government. 
In addition to basic grants of authority, there may be other statutory authority 
available to carry out obligations proposed to be assumed by the United States in 
an EAA. For example, the Air Force is authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 9503 to 
participate in cooperative research and development projects. That section pro-
vides that "the Secretary of the Air Force may conduct and participate in research 
and development programs relating to the Air Force, and may procure or contract 
for the use of facilities, supplies, and services that are needed for these pro-
grams" (emphasis added). 
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One of the advantages of using 10 U.S.C. § 9503 as authority for coopera-
tive research and development executive agreements, rather than 10 U.S.C. 
§ 8012(b), is that § 9503 does not require the use of the policies, clauses, and 
procedures contained in the DAR because there is no procurement of supplies 
or services. Rather, the Air Force is conducting or participating in research and 
development programs. 
The role played by the Armed Services Procurement Act and the DAR in an 
EAA is not entirely clear. Some argue that the organic authority of the Secretary 
to conduct the affairs of the DOD in conjunction with the congressional authori-
zation and appropriation of funds for the project is sufficient authority to 
conclude an EAA without regard to either 10 U.S.C. § 2301 or the DAR. In the 
author's opinion, the better view is that the Armed Services Procurement Act, by 
its own terms, "applies to the purchase, and contract to purchase ... of all 
property ... and all services" by the military department. This would include the 
purchase of technology via an EAA. Consequently, the Armed Services Pro-
curement Act and the DAR apply to an EAA which is, in reality, a contract for 
the purchase of supplies or services. 
The use of DAR policy and procedures, which have been designed for use 
primarily in contracting with commercial concerns, has been a source of consid-
erable irritation between the United States and its allies when engaged in 
negotiating an EAA for a cooperative weapons procurement program. Notwith-
standing these problems, the DAR provisions must be applied unless deviations 
are approved by an appropriate authority. In the case of statutorily required 
provisions, there is currently no waiver or deviation authority available. The only 
exception would be when other statutory authority for the acquisition is avail-
able, such as 10 U.S.C. § 9503, or possibly specific congressional action to 
authorize the acquisition without regard to the statutorily required clauses. An 
example of a congressional waiver of procurement statutes is the NATO Mutual 
Support Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2331. 
The irritations caused by the legal obligation in EAAs to impose statutorily 
reqUired clauses upon sovereign nations and important allies should be reviewed 
by Congress. Although these clauses represent important public policy consid-
erations, they may be overshadowed by the importance Congress places on NATO 
standardization and interoperability. One of the principal goals of the United 
States and its NATO allies is the standardization and interoperability of weapons 
systems. Given this goal, appropriate legislative action should be taken to provide 
the secretaries of the military departments authority to exclude otherwise 
statutorily required clauses from executive agreement acquisitions when the 
EAA would enhance progress toward NATO standardization and interoperabil-
ity. 
The following material will cover the acquisition issues in negotiating an EAA 
under the current statutory scheme, beginning with very basic issues which are 
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often overlooked or given little consideration by government negotiators. Since 
the current law requires the EAA to meet normal procurement standards, 
compliance with these areas should be an important part of any negotiated 
agreement with a foreign government. 
III. ACQUISITION ISSUES IN THE EAA 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements for the Acquisition of Defense Supplies 
and Services 
A U.S. government negotiator embarking on the acquisition of foreign tech-
nology through an EAA must meet numerous statutory and regulatory obliga-
tions before he or she may properly conclude the arrangement. For example, 
there must be an appropriate exception to the statutory requirement to formally 
advertise the procurement. 4 Additionally, there is a requirement to seek compe-
tition from the maximum number of qualified sources,5 a preference for U.S. 
sources,6 an obligation to ensure that prices paid are fair and reasonable and 
supported by certified cost and pricing data. 7 If it is later determined that the 
"certified" data was inaccurate, incomplete, or not current, the price will be 
reduced by the amount increased by the inaccuracy or incompleteness. More-
over, the act (P.L. 87-653, Truth in Negotiations) contains several exceptions: 
[T]he requirements of this subsection need not be applied to con-
tracts or subcontracts where the price negotiated is based on ade-
quate price competition, established catalog or market prices of 
commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, 
prices set by law or regulation, or in exceptional cases where the 
head of the agency determines that the requirements of this subsec-
tion may be waived and states in writing his reasons for such deter-
mination. 
For purposes of the EAA, the most significant exception involves the determi-
nation of the head of an agency to waive the requirements of the Truth in 
Negotiation Act. The DAR 3-807.3(b) specifically waives the requirement for 
submission of cost or pricing data in the following manner: 
Cost or pricing may be waived in exceptional cases when the Secre-
tary (or, in the case of a contract with a foreign government or agency 
thereof, the Head of a Contracting Activity) authorizes such waiver 
and states in writing his reasons for such determination (emphasis 
added). 
4. 10 V.S.C. § 2304(a) (1982). 
5. 10 V.S.C. § 2304(g) (1982). 
6. 41 V.S.C. § lO(a)-(d) (1982). 
7. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(f) (1982); DAR 3-807.3. 
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In the case of an EAA, a waiver of the requirement to provide certified cost 
and pricing data makes considerable sense. One of the primary reasons for using 
an EAA to acquire non-domestic equipment is the desire to use the acquisition 
management system of the foreign government. The use of the foreign govern-
ment's current procurement practice avoids the disruption associated with over-
laying a new, and oftentimes far more complex, U.S. government acquisition 
system necessary when a foreign firm contracts directly with the United States. 
Avoiding the requirement for obtaining certified cost and pricing data, U.S. 
style, is just one of the many areas which may eliminate potential conflict 
between the DOD and a foreign manufacturer and its government. 
Notwithstanding these important administrative and political considerations, 
the contracting officer must have sufficient information to make a determination 
that the price is fair and reasonable. Consequently, a si,gnificant consideration in 
choosing the EAA route is the adequacy of the foreign government's acquisition 
system, specifically in the area of price determination. Appropriate consider-
ation and analysis of the foreign government's procurement system, especially its 
pricing policies, should be made before embarking on an EAA. Particular atten-
tion should be given to those pricing policies of the foreign government which 
may result in a violation of U.S. procurement law, such as the prohibition against 
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contracting. 
Section XV of the DAR establishes contract cost principles and procedures 
generally used in the negotiation and performance of defense contracts for 
supplies, services, and research and development.8 Cost principles provided in 
DAR 15-205 are used in the pricing of defense contracts whenever cost analysis 
is performed pursuant to DAR 3-807.2.9 Deviations from the cost principles 
must be processed in accordance with DAR 1-109.3/° which requires the ap-
proval of the DAR Councilor the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations 
and Logistics). 
Foreign governments do not usually price their defense contracts in the same 
way that U.S. government contracts are priced. What may be unallowable in a 
U.S. contract may be a normal cost in a contract between a foreign government 
and its contractors .. Profit ranges often differ. European contracts often have 
lower profit rates but allow costs, such as entertainment or advertising expenses, 
that would be generally unallowable on a U.S. contract. Because of the enormous 
administrative problems associated with using the U.S. cost principles to 
negotiate defense contracts with foreign governments, applicability of DAR 
15-205 should be waived. 
Even if a waiver is obtained, some costs remain unallowable in a defense 
contract. DAR 15-205.1, "Advertising Costs," generally prohibits advertising 
8. DAR 15-102. 
9. Id. 
10. DAR 15-204(a). 
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costs and reflects a statutory requirement ll that advertising costs be paid out of 
defense contractor profits. Also, DAR 15-205.37 reflects the statutory policy 
against the payment of contingent fees,12 and it must be observed notwithstand-
ing a blanket waiver of DAR 15-205. 
One of the common tools available to the negotiator/contracting officer in the 
negotiation of the contract price is the ability to have the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency audit a contractor's proposal. In addition to the contracting officer's 
audit authority, the Comptroller General of the United States has very broad 
power, under 10 U.S.C. § 2313, to examine the books of a government contrac-
tor. The foreign government, however, may object to the audit, and the sec-
retaries of the military departments have the authority to waive the audit when 
the contract is with a foreign government. If the contract is with a foreign 
contractor, waiver of the audit right requires the concurrence of the Comptroller 
General. 
Several other restrictions must be considered during EAA negotiations. For 
example, care must be taken to avoid a cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract; 13 
contingent fee arrangements must meet statutory requirements; 14 cost type 
contracts require a determination that such a contract is likely to be less costly to 
the United States;15 the fee for performing cost type contracts is limited by law;16 
and notice of a cost type subcontract or a fixed price subcontract in excess of 
$25,000 or five per cent of the estimated cost of the prime contract must be given 
to the contracting officer.17 Also, 31 U .S.C. § 203 restricts the assignment of 
claims against the United States, and 18 U.S.C. § 874 prohibits kickbacks. 
Before concluding an EAA, thorough consideration should be given to restric-
tions contained in the annual DOD Appropriation Act. Coverage of these mat-
ters can be found at DAR 6-300. Most significant of these restrictions are the 
restrictions on the purchase of specialty metals from non-U.S. sources18 and 
contracts with foreign business entities for research and development in connec-
tion with any weapon system where there is a U.S. company equally competent to 
carry out the research and development at a lower cost. There is also a prohibi-
tion against the expenditure of appropriated funds for the construction or 
conversion of any naval vessel in a foreign shipyard. Moreover, in the FY 1984 
DOD Appropriation Act!9 Congress has mandated "written guarantees" from 
11. Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-457, § 832,92 Stat. 1231 (1978). 
See Pub. L. No. 96-527, § 732,92 Stat. 3068 (1980). 
12. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(b), 41 V.S.C. § 254 (1982). 
13. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(a) (1982). 
14. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(b) (1982) and DAR 1-505. 
15. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(c) (1982). 
16. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(d) (1982). 
17. 10 V.S.C. § 2306(e) (1982). This requirement may be avoided by the use of a fixed price contract. 
18. DAR 6-302. 
19. Pub. L. No. 98-212. 
334 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
contractors producing "weapon systems." The attorney reviewing the EAA must 
fully review the appropriation act which provides the funding for the acquisition 
to determine whether any of the restrictions would affect the proposed acquisi-
tion. 
Finally, there are four contractural provisions which are required by law and 
must be placed in the EAA. These provisions are: DAR 7-104. 16,Gratuities; DAR 
7-103.20, Covenant Against Contingent Fees; DAR 7-103.19, Official Not to Benefit; 
and DAR 7-104.95, Preference for u.s. Flag Carners. 
B. Other Considerations in Negotiating an EAA 
In addition to the U.S. procurement process, attention must be given to the 
other potential negotiating topics peculiar to U.S. allies who are the most likely 
sources of technology transfer. NATO countries continue as important sources 
for defense technologies, and an understanding of the NATO system for han-
dling intellectual property can assist U.S. negotiators in achieving technology 
transfer. 
1. Transfer of Intellectual Property 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N A TO) has established guidelines 
for balancing the needs of both the purchasers and sellers of intellectual prop-
erty and reconciling their competing interests. The problem is fairly difficult for 
NATO, since it must deal with several nations' domestic laws governing rights in 
intellectual property, as well as differing languages and customs. As noted 
earlier, one of the principal goals of the United States and its NATO allies is the 
standardization and interoperability of weapon systems. A free and fair ex-
change of intellectual property is critical to NATO's achieving that goal.20 
Under the NATO guidelines,21 intellectual property has been defined in the 
following manner: 
The term "Intellectual Property" (IP), whether background or 
foreground, includes inventions, patented or not, trademarks, in-
20. NATO has taken an active interest in this area and has published the following: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDEUNES IN THE FIELD OF LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION FOR THE PUR-
POSE OF ARMAMENTS STANDARDIZATION OR INTEROPERABIUTY, NATO Doc. No. ACl94-D/283 (revised 
September 1979); NATO AGREEMENT ON THE CoMMUNICATION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR DE-
FENSE PUIlPOIiES (April 1979); 1 MIUTARY EQUIPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LEGISLATION (1976). 
In addition to the NATO publications, see Gapeynski,NATO Agreement on 1M Communication of Technical 
lnformationfrrr Defense Purposes, 6 INT'L LAw. 359 (1972) (review of NATO AGREEMENT ON THE COM-
MUNICATION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR DEFENSE PuRPOSES). This article is useful background 
information on the subject of NATO technical information. 
21. CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS, NATO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP, AND 
NATO INDUSTRIAL ADVISORY GROUP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES AND GUIDEUNES IN THE 
FIELD OF LICENSING AND CO-PRODUCTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARMAMENTS, STANDARDIZATION OR 
INTER-OPERABIUTY, NATO Doc. No. ACl94-D/283, at 3 (September 1979). 
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dustrial designs, copyrights and technical information including 
software, data, designs, technical know-how, manufacturing infor-
mation and know-how, techniques, technical data packages, man-
ufacturing data packages and trade secrets. 22 
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This definition lumps together many legal concepts under the term "intellectual 
property," even though the domestic laws of the parties to an EAA might treat 
them separately. For example, under U.S. law, infringement of a patent would 
be treated differently than the misuse of technical know-how. 
Other significant definitions in the NATO guidelines are: 
"(B]ackground information" ... information which is necessary to or 
useful in achieving the objectives of a specific contract, project, 
programme or agreement, but which was generated prior to or 
outside the scope of such arrangements; 
... "[F]oreground information" ... information which is generated 
in the course of a specific contract, project, programme or agree-
ment or the like by the parties or their contractors; 
the rights to use or have used IP are termed Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPR) and include rights derived from patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, industrial designs, contract clauses, disclosure in 
confidence techniques or other means of control of lP.23 
All NATO nations provide patent protection for inventions determined to be 
a "new method, technique, process, machine[s], apparatus, manufacture, prod-
uct, composition of matter or a new use or improvement thereof."24 As in the 
United States, scientific discoveries and mathematical theories are not covered by 
the patent laws of NATO countries.25 With the exception of Canada and the 
United States, a patent is granted to the first applicant in NATO countries.26 
Generally, an invention should be novel and useful to be patentable. Specific 
requirements for meeting the novelty requirement, however, differ between 
nations. 
An opposition procedure generally is available in NATO countries. A request 
for a patent may be opposed because the invention is obvious, lacks novelty or 
usefulness. Once granted, a patent gives the holder the right to exclude others 
from making, selling, and using the subject of the invention. In some NATO 
countries, "any use by others may be an infringement ... while in other countries 
the use must be commercial, professional or industrial to be an infringement."27 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. NATO WORKING GROUP ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, 1 MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY LEGISLATION 33 (1976). 
25. [d. at 9. 
26. [d. at 10. 
27. [d. at 13. 
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With the exception of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, all 
NATO countries provide "march in" rights, which permit the granting of a 
compulsory license if the holder of a patent fails to work a patent "adequately," 
"suitably," or "conscientiously."28 Finally, all NATO countries have legislatively 
protected classified inventions related to defense. 29 
Most NATO countries do not have specific statutory protection for designs. 
Some protection, however, may be found for designs to the extent that they are 
covered by copyright law, patent law, or law on unfair competition.30 All NATO 
countries provide copyright protection for literary and artistic work. Protection 
extends to the "novel form or manner of presentation of an idea but not the idea 
as SUCh."31 Consequently, an author has the exclusive right to "publish, translate 
... alter, dramatise, perform, print, ... copy, display, record or perform in 
public his work."32 Trademarks are also protected by NATO countries. 
Each NATO country provides legal redress for infringement of industrial or 
intellectual property rights. 33 In some NATO countries, it is possible to bring 
both civil and criminal actions against a patent infringer. Remedies are generally 
available to restrain or enjoin the misuse of intellectual property or to compen-
sate the injured party. For example, in "Canada, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and the United States, the court may issue an interim 
injunction restraining the defendent" from further infringement.34 As noted, 
several NATO countries provide for a compulsory licensing arrangement. Not-· 
withstanding this principle, the "failure of a patent owner to work a patented 
invention" does not excuse an infringement. Moreover, the subsequent grant of 
a license would not provide protection against earlier infringements. 35 
In negotiating the EAA, it is particularly important to establish the specific 
types of intellectual property required and obtain rights in that property 
sufficient for the successful accomplishment of the agreement. The NATO 
Intellectual Property Group (AC/94 Group) and NATO Industrial Advisory 
Group, which represent the viewpoint of industry, have established principles 
and guidelines for licensing and coproduction efforts.36 These guidelines can 
form the basis for the section of the EAA that covers the transfer of technical 
data necessary to operate and maintain the equipment obtained through the 
EAA. 
28. Id. at 14. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 15. 
31. /d. at 16. 
32.Id. 
33. Id. at 20. 
34. /d. at 21. 
35. Id. at 23. 
36. See Guidelines, supra note 20. 
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The guidelines published by the AC/94 Group are divided into four main 
areas.37 First, problem areas associated with intellectual property rights are 
identified. Second is a general overview of the guidelines. Third, intellectual 
property principles are established which, if implemented, could overcome the 
problems identified in part one. Finally, guidelines are developed to assist 
NATO countries in adjusting their national policies and practices to comply with 
the principles of the third section. 
One of the most significant problem areas in EAAs is the failure to consider 
the intellectual property rights issue early enough in the negotiation process. For 
example, the failure to consider the possible delayed entry of participants in a 
collaborative program may result in an inability to obtain the necessary intellec-
tual property rights from a manufacturer that may have already entered into 
agreements inconsistent with the collaborative program. Consequently, the EAA 
should commit the nations to provide for delayed entry in their contracts with 
their domestic industry. Problems may also occur if the nations desiring a 
collaborative program have a significant disparity in technical capability. Obliga-
tions in an EAA should be consistent with the expected level of technical capabil-
ity of the respective nations. 
Any failure to state clearly intellectual property rights provisions can, and 
usually does, lead to serious problems during implementation. For example, lack 
of precision in definitional terms can lead a nation to believe that it has far 
broader rights in technical information than that intended by the other parties to 
the EAA.38 Moreover, rights to use technical data for spin-off benefits in non-
defense areas are generally not included in the EAA. 
Other issues include restrictions of sales to third parties, recoupment of 
research and development costs which may make the weapon system too costly, 
and restrictions limiting licensed production to a country's own needs, thus 
making it uneconomical to set up a production line.39 For example, intellectual 
property may be transferred with the explicit understanding that it may not be 
used to manufacture equipment which will be sold to a particular country. A 
manufacturer in country X may transfer technical data for a weapon to a 
manufacturer in country Y with the agreement that the data cannot be used to 
produce weapons for country 1. Also, if it appears that the recoupment of 
research and development costs will make the cost of the weapon system prohib-
itive, it might be possible to seek either a partial or complete waiver of the 
recoupment. Some relaxation on limitations against third country sales may be 
possible if it makes production more economical. 
In response to these and other problems, the AC/94 Group prepared a general 
statement as an introduction to its more detailed principles and guidelines. The 
37. Id. at 2. 
38. Id. at 5. 
39. Id. at 6. 
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general statement clearly requires an interrelated consideration of the guidelines 
and establishes several important principles. 
Licensing and disclosure of IP/IPR for NATO purposes must be 
undertaken by or in collaboration with the owner of the IP/IPR. 
Governments are not entitled to dispose of IP/IPR in which the 
rights are owned by industry, unless and to the extent they have the 
right to do so legally or contractually. 
Consistent with paragraphs 3 and 4 above, firms must be assured 
of appropriate safeguards and fair and reasonable compensation, 
financial or otherwise, for the use of their IP/IPR.40 
Part III of AC/94-D/283 establishes extensive principles focused on promoting 
the exchange of information between "NATO nations to help reduce unneces-
sary duplication of effort ... and enhanc[ing] the feasibility of future standard-
ization and interoperability."41 NATO countries are also encouraged by the 
N A TO publication to utilize contractual options to obtain rights in intellectual 
property which would enable other NATO countries to participate in the pro-
gram. This would require a provision obligating a contractor owning intellectual 
property to grant licenses to foreign firms or governments necessary to fulfill any 
international collaborative arrangement. Payment for such licenses must be on 
fair and reasonable terms. Moreover, any transfer of intellectual property 
should be appropriately safeguarded. The licensing arrangements must be 
sufficiently broad to cover the post-production phase, including technical data 
necessary for maintenance and repair. Rights to the use of the data should be 
sufficiently broad so as to permit competitive procurement of repair and 
maintenance services. 
The principles encourage "prompt and appropriate action to seek amend-
ments or waivers to (national) laws, regulations, policies and practices, which 
prevent or delay implementation of the principles laid down in this paper."42 To 
date, the United States has not taken any specific regulatory action to implement 
the principles. The United tates has, however, decided to use the paper as 
"practical and workable guidance."43 
Finally, Section IV provides guidelines on how the individual nations may 
adjust their policies to comply with the principles stated in Section III. In order 
to fulfill the principles, a nation proposing a collaborative program should either 
own the intellectual property or be able to cause the owner to grant a license to 
use all necessary technical data on fair and reasonable terms. 
40. [d. at 7-8, para. II. 3, 4, and 5. 
41. [d. at 8. 
42. [d. at II. 
43. Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments from the Principal Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, Intellectual Property Principles and Guidelines in 
the Field of Licensing and Co-production for the Purpose of Armaments Standardization or In-
teroperability (September 12, 1980). 
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In summary, NATO working groups have published several documents which 
are of importance in the negotiation of an EAA. These documents provide 
information on the legal principles governing the ownership of intellectual 
property in NATO countries and guidelines and principles to be observed in 
negotiating a collaborative weapon acquisition. 
2. Authorization and Consent 
As noted, most NATO countries provide remedies for patent holders for the 
infringement of their patents. One of the more common remedies is a court 
order prohibiting the continued infringement of the patent. All NATO nations 
provide an exception to injunctive relief whenever the patent is infringed by 
governmental activity. For example, in the United States, the exception is con-
tained in 28 U .S.C. § 1498(a), which states: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of 
the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United 
States without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or 
manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against 
the United States in the Court of Claims for the recovery of his 
reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture. 
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an 
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States 
by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation 
for the Government and with the authorization or consent of the 
Government shall be construed as use or manufacture for the 
United States. 
Regulatory implementation of the authorization and consent authority is con-
tained at DAR 9-102. Use of this authority is quite common, and there is 
extensive case law on the matter. One of the leading cases involving the use of 
this authority on an acquisition pursuant to an EAA is Hughes Aircraft Company v. 
United States. 44 In Hughes, the plaintiff filed suit alleging government infringe-
ment of its patent pursuant to ajoint U.S. and U.K. defense satellite communica-
tions system program. The joint program was the topic of a 1970 Memorandum 
of Agreement (MOU) between the United States and the United Kingdom in 
which the United States granted the United Kingdom and its contractors the use 
of "technical information, design rights, patent rights and licenses vested in the 
U.S. government."45 Launch vehicles were procured by the United States on 
behalf of the United Kingdom. The satellite was fabricated in England, using 
components acquired from a U.S. corporation and shipped to the United King-
44. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
45. ld. at 894. 
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dom. After Ministry of Defense inspection and acceptance of the satellite, it was 
shipped to the United States, further tested, and mated to a booster vehicle. Two 
satellites were acquired in this manner, and both were launched by the United 
States. 
The Department of Justice opposed the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims on 
the litigation, claiming that 28 U.S.C. § 1498 did not apply since the use by the 
United States ot plaintiff's patents was on behalf of and solely for the benefit of 
the United Kingdom. Also, the Justice Department claimed that any authoriza-
tion and consent was given extra-contractually and after the commencement of 
litigation.46 
The court found that the components manufactured by Philco-Ford and 
Marconi under contracts with the United Kingdom were for the benefit of the 
United States. In making this finding, the Court of Claims concluded that a letter 
from a Department of Defense official to his counterpart in the U.K. Ministry of 
Defense (M.O.D.) was a proper authorization and consent, even though Marconi 
was under contract with the M.O.D. and not the DOD. An additional factor 
supporting the court's conclusion was the cooperative nature of the satellite 
program, which benefited the vital national defense interests of both nations. 
Consequently, the Marconi-U.K. contract was considered to be "'for' the U.S. 
government via the cooperative program established by the MOU ."47 
The Hughes case is an example of the broad scope of authorization and 
consent within the United States. It also reflects the concerns of the court 
regarding the status of an EAA between the United States and a foreign ally in 
defense matters. The significance attached to the MOU was sufficient to 
expand the contract between a foreign contractor and its government into a 
contract which was also "for" the United States. 
As noted, all NATO governments have either express or implied authority to 
use or have used on their behalf patented inventions, subject to the payment of 
reasonable compensation.48 There is, however, a broad spectrum of conse-
quences for a non-domestic contractor, who is liable for the unauthorized use of 
industrial property during the performance of a government contract. A U.S. 
contractor who has "authorization and consent" authority may infringe a patent, 
if necessary, to achieve the desired results of the contract. Unauthorized 
infringements or infringement not necessary for the performance of the con-
tract, however, will result in contractor liability. Moreover, if the U.S. government 
contract does not include the contractual provision located at DAR 7-104.5, 
Patent Indemnity, the United States will be liable for the infringement under 28 
46. Id. at 897. 
47. Id. at 900. 
48. 1 NATO WORKING GROUP ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY LEGISLATION 33 (1976). 
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U.S.C. § 1498 and will not receive reimbursement from the infringing contrac-
tor, whether foreign or domestic. 
In Italy, however, a clause is placed in all contracts requiring the contractor to 
assume full financial liability for infringement.49 Norway uses a clause which 
requires contractor indemnification for government costs arising out of 
infringement actions.50 A Belgian contractor, however, is not responsible for 
compensation when the government furnishes detailed specifications without 
providing notice of the potential infringement. 51 In short, when negotiating an 
executive agreement for acquisition of a non-domestic weapon system, the statu-
tory framework and the contractual arrangements between the foreign govern-
ment and its contractor should be carefully considered. Payment of reasonable 
compensation for infringement would then be a cost associated with the pur-
chase of the system. 
3. Impact of the Freedom of Information Act on the Exchange of 
Information 
The Freedom of Information Act52 is a matter of considerable concern to 
governments contemplating an EAA with the United States. As mentioned in the 
preceding section on the transfer of intellectual property, the purchaser under 
an EAA will require a considerable amount of data and information concerning 
the cost and technical capability of the weapon system. At the same time, 
however, the Freedom of Intormation Act (F.O.LA.) appears to permit and, in 
some situations, to require the release of information provided by the foreign 
government and its contractors. While an adequate discussion of the F.O.LA. 
would require a separate paper, a summary of the exceptions to the general 
release rule reveals considerable protection for the type of information generally 
provided by foreign governments during negotiations and performance of an 
executive agreement acquisition. 
DOD Directive 5400.7, Availability to the Public of Department if Defense Informa-
tion, establishes the general policy to make available the maximum amount of 
information concerning DOD operations and activities. Exceptions to the gen-
eral disclosure rule for DOD are identical to those exemptions contained in the 
F.O.LA. at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b(l)-(9). 
The exception from mandatory disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) gener-
ally corresponds to the "state secrets" privilege discussed in United States v. 
Reynolds. 53 This exemption from mandatory release protects against the disclo-
49. ld. at 38. 
50.ld. 
51. ld. at 39. 
52. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502. 88 Stat. 1561 (1974». 
53. United States v. ReynOlds. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). See Theriault v. United States. 395 F. Supp. 637 
(C.D. Calif. 1975). 
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sure of information which would harm the national security or conduct of 
foreign relations by the United States. Under the present exemption, informa-
tion may be withheld if: "(a) specifically authorized under criteria established by 
an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy, and (b) in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive 
Order."54 
Consequently, if the acquiring agency can factually establish that information 
provided by the foreign government was properly classified as "secret" informa-
tion under an executive order, the data is not subject to release. Executive Order 
11652,55 as amended by Executive Order 11714,56 was the original executive 
order governing this area. It has been superseded by Executive Order 12065, 
which meets the statutory requirement for an executive order covering the 
classification of documents in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 
If agency personnel classifying the information are familiar with and apply 
correctly the standards of the executive order,57 the information will not be 
subject to mandatory release. 
An interesting situation may arise, however, if a foreign government provides 
classified information which is properly classified as secret under its domestic 
laws, but does not meet the criteria necessary for classification under Executive 
Order 12065. To date, no case has been decided with that factual pattern. 
Section 1-505 of Executive Order 12065 may provide some support for retaining 
the foreign government's classification with the following language: "Foreign 
government information shall either retain its original classification designation 
or be assigned a United States classification designation that shall ensure a 
degree of protection equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the 
information." 
As a part of the negotiation process, the foreign government may provide 
confidential business information received from its contractors. This type 
of information may be withheld from mandatory disclosure under 5 U.S.c. 
§ 552(b)(3) if the information is "specifically exempted from disclosure by stat-
ute." The F.O.LA. further requires that the statute which requires confidential-
ity either must permit discretion to release the information or, if there is discre-
tion to release, the statute must establish "particular criteria for withholding or 
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld."58 
Another exemption59 protects private information which relates to confiden-
54. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I). 
55. 37 Fed. Reg. 5209 (1972). 
56. 38 Fed. Reg. 10245 (1973). 
57. Halperin v. Department of State, Civ. No. 75-674 (D.C. 1976). 
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982). 
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1982). 
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tial commercial or financial matters of a corporation, aSSOCIatiOn, or private 
individual. This exemption can be used to protect from release such items as 
technical60 and cost6l proposals provided by the foreign manufacturer to its 
government for negotiations with the United States. Trade secrets are also 
protected by this exemption. 62 The inclusion of trade secrets within this exemp-
tion has produced years of judicial interpretation and a time-tested definition 
from the Restatement of Torts: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, 
pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do 
not know or use it. ... "63 
Protection of trade secrets from release preserves the traditional confidential 
relationship between government agencies and private individuals who provide 
information that would not otherwise be revealed to the public. Any general 
policy requiring the release of this type of information would have a very 
negative impact upon the government's ability to acquire that type of informa-
tion in the future. 
The basic thrust of the Freedom of Information Act is to encourage the 
release of information by U.S. government agencies. The Reagan Administra-
tion, however, has brought a new view to the release of agency records. In a 
memorandum dated May 4, 1981, Attorney General William French Smith 
announced that the "Department's current policy is to defend all suits challeng-
ing an agency's decision to deny a request submitted under the F.O.I.A .... 
unless the denial lacks a substantial legal basis" or the "denial presents an 
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on other agencies' ability to protect impor-
tant records." 
This policy memorandum supersedes former Attorney General Bell's letter of 
May 5, 1977, which stated that "[t]he government should not withhold docu-
ments unless it is important to the public interest to do so, even if there is some 
arguable legal basis for the witholding." Consequently, the prior Department of 
Justice policy was to defend suits only when the disclosure was "demonstrably 
harmful," even though the documents fell within the F.O.I.A. exemptions. 
As a result of this significant change in policy, it is very unlikely that a Freedom 
of Information Act request will result in the release of protectable information 
concerning the negotiation of an EAA for the acquisition of a non-domestic 
weapon system. The exemptions from the mandatory release provisions appear 
adequate to protect the type of information the foreign government and its 
contractor are most desirous of protecting. 
60. Fenster v. Fletcher, Civ. No. 882-71 (D.C. 1971). 
61. National Parks and Conservation Association v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (1976). 
62. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
63. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1934). 
344 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
4. Funding and Payment Provisions in an Executive Agreement Acquisition 
One of the major problems between the acquisition policy of the United States 
and potential foreign government partners in an EAA is in the area of program 
funding. Currently, the DOD requires the full funding of its procurement 
program. Potential NATO partners, however, incrementally fund their weapon 
system programs. 
Although there is no statutory requirement for fully funding DOD procure-
ment of major weapon systems, DOD Directive 7200.4, Full Funding of DOD 
Procurement Programs, provides the following guidance: 
Full funding is the term used to describe the principle which has 
been applied by the Congress in providing funds for the Department 
of Defense programs which are covered within the Procurement title 
of the yearly appropriation act. It has no application to any other 
appropriations (Military Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, 
and Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) contained in 
other titles of the act. The objective is to provide funds at the outset 
for the total estimated cost of a given item so that the Congress and 
the public can clearly see and have a complete knowledge of the full 
dimensions and cost when it is first presented for an appropriation. 
In practice, it means that each annual appropriation request must 
contain the funds estimated to be required to cover the total cost to 
be incurred in completing delivery of a given quantity of usable end 
items, such as aircraft, missiles, ships, vehicles, ammunition and all 
other items of equipment. 
The basic thrust of this policy is to fully disclose the entire cost of a given 
number of end items (e.g., aircraft, missiles, ships, or tanks) for which funds have 
been authorized and appropriated in a single fiscal year. The production of a 
major weapon takes a number of years, however, and numerous components 
require a significant lead-time. Consequently, the full funding policy recognizes 
an exception to this general policy and permits the use of the advance procure-
ment concept to acquire long lead-time items, as follows: 
Advance Procurement. The general policy expressed above is intended 
to prescribe that funds for the total estimated cost of an item be 
available in the year in which procurement action is initiated for that 
item. An extension of this policy would, under certain conditions, 
permit the procurement of long lead-time components in advance of 
the fiscal year in which the related end item is to be procured. 
* * * 
In this regard, long lead-time component procurement will be limited 
to those components whose lead-times are significantly longer than 
other components of the same end item. The dollar effect of this 
principle should be that the cost of the components procured in 
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advance is relatively low as compared to that portion of the end item 
costs for which funding is deferred. If an unduly short lead-time is 
established for an end item as a whole, it would tend to force a 
relatively large volume of components into the category where they 
might be considered eligible for advance procurement funding. This 
could compromise the principle of full funding and create difficul-
ties in overall program management. Therefore, it is important that 
lead-times be established which are normal and reasonable. It is 
important, also, that proposals for advance funding be made on a 
selective basis with full consideration of the applicability of the com-
ponents to other programs or as spares in the event that the prospec-
tive program fails to materialize. This practice has been accepted by 
the Congress as a means to facilitate certain procurement programs. 
This Directive permits the continued use of the practice, provided 
that each case is specifically identified and justified on its merits. 
345 
For the acquisition of major weapon systems, the entire DOD planning, pro-
gramming, and budgeting process and the resulting contractual arrangements 
are based upon the full funding policy as adjusted by the limited exception for 
advance procurement.64 The only significant variation from this arrangement is 
multi-year contracting.65 A multi-year contract is a specific type of contract which 
covers government requirements of more than one year but less than five years. 
Funds are appropriated annually for the year's requirement, and the contractor 
is protected against a cancellation loss by a contract provision which allows the 
reimbursement of unrecovered nonrecurring costs included in prices for can-
celled items. 66 A contractor's recovery is limited by a cancellation ceiling which 
may not exceed $100 million unless Congress is notified. 67 It is significant to note 
that funds are not obligated to cover the contingent liability for the cancellation 
ceiling amount.68 
Most potential European governmental partners, however, do not fully fund 
their approved weapon system procurement programs. Generally, the European 
government will approve the entire acquisition of a weapon system and then 
appropriate funds on an annual basis necessary to accomplish the work during 
that particular year. Consequently, contractual arrangements with their domes-
tic industries are based upon this method of funding rather than the full funding 
policy peculiar to the United States. Problems arise when the United States 
attempts to negotiate an EAA which reflects the full funding policy and the 
resulting limited commitment, in terms of numbers of systems, with a foreign 
64. DOD Directive 7200.4, para. D. 
65. DAR 1-322. 
66. DAR 1-332.1(b)(4). 
67.ld. 
68. See H.R. REp. No. 349, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1967). 
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government whose contractual arrangements are based upon full authorization 
of the entire buy and incremental funding of annual work. Consequently, DOD 
must either waive the full funding policy or lose the benefits associated with 
using the standard purchasing arrangements between the foreign government 
and its industry. 
A U.S. negotiator faced with a mismatch between the U.S. funding procedure 
and the normal procurement policy of the foreign government still has some 
options available. These generally involve waiver of the full funding policy. In 
addition, there are several recent legislative initiatives which expand the current 
DAR multi-year contracting concept to the point where it is now useful in 
acquiring a major weapon system. 
Under current law, the first option is the waiver of the full funding policy. A 
waiver of DOD Directive 7200.4, however, is not lightly granted. The full 
funding policy reflects an accommodation between the executive and legislative 
branches of government. Two important congressional concerns are protected 
by the policy. First, Congress retains its control over the "purse strings" of 
government through the annual authorization and appropriation procedure. 
Massive, long term commitments to particular weapon systems would reduce 
that control. Second, incremental funding of major programs would clearly 
commit a future Congress to the programs selected by an earlier Congress. 
Thus, waivers of full funding are difficult to obtain. 
While these concerns are understandable and accurately reflect appropriate 
congressional responses to executive branch abuses in earlier times,69 the time 
necessary to conduct research, development, and quantity production of major 
weapon systems has increased dramatically. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, 
to change direction drastically on a major weapons program. If the need for high 
performance fighter aircraft continues, then the only real option for the Air 
Force is the F-15. It would take far too long to conduct the research and 
development necessary to field an aircraft superior to the F-15. As a result, the 
annual question is not whether to purchase the aircraft, but rather how many will 
the United States buy. Unfortunately, the entire planning, programming, and 
budgeting process, and the resulting contractual arrangements, are based upon 
the annual funding concept, which permits Congress to revisit the F-15 program 
every year. The cost of maintaining flexibility to stop a program and receive 
completed end items is enormous. This is especially true when such flexibility is 
not needed because, as a general rule, the only changes made are slight varia-
tions in quantity. 
A possible solution would be to include, in the EAA, a series of priced option 
provisions for completion of end items during the successive fiscal years of the 
69. See Hopkins & Nut(, Anti-Deficiency Act, 80 MIL. L. REv. 51 (1978) and 59 Comp. Gen. 369, 
B-198206 (1980). 
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program. This option provision would also be included in the contract with the 
non-domestic manufacturer. For example, if funds for the following fiscal year 
are not appropriated, then the clause limiting the government's obligation would 
operate and delivery of the parts and materials would occur. If, however, the 
United States desired delivery of some end items, then an option could be 
funded and exercised for those items without authorizing and funding un-
needed future fiscal years of the program. The significant advantage of this 
arrangement would be that it gives the United States an opportunity to end a 
program without paying the now matured multi-year contingent liabilities. 
Moreover, if completed end items are necessary, then funding for the option 
provision can be provided to continue production of the completed end items 
required by the United States. 
All of these funding arrangements must be considered when nogotiating the 
EAA. The negotiator should understand fully the procurement policies and 
procedures of the foreign government so there may be an appropriate match 
between the U.S. authorization and appropriation procedure, the commitments 
made in the executive agreement, and the foreign government's ability to im-
plement the executive agreement by using its standard procurement procedures. 
5. Potential Anti-Deficiency Act Violation when Payment is in a Foreign 
Currency 
Since one of the basic purposes for using an EAA as an acquisition vehicle is to 
use the foreign government's procurement system, payment will probably be 
made in foreign currency. A major risk associated with entering into a commit-
ment for payment in foreign currency is the possibility of adverse currency 
fluctuations resulting in the amount of U.S. dollars authorized and appropriated 
being insufficient for the purchase of the amount of required foreign currency. 
An inability to meet the financial obligations under the executive agreement 
would be a violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act. 70 
Title III of the Fiscal Year 1979 DOD Appropriation Act1 1 established a 
"Foreign Currency Fluctuation - Defense Account" to meet this problem. The 
account eliminates substantial gains and losses to appropriations caused by 
fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates by requiring transfers to the 
account when the exchange rate becomes more favorable and permitting trans-
fers from the account when the rate becomes unfavorable. A base exchange rate 
is set at the time of budget submission, and variations from this rate determine 
the amount transferred to or from the account. Consequently, the correct use of 
this account should eliminate the possibility of an Anti-Deficiency Act violation. 
70. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1982). 
71. Pub. L. No. 95-457, 92 Stat. 1231 (1978). 
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6. Department of the Treasury Directives 
Funds transfers between the United States and a foreign government are 
made by the Department of the Treasury. Treasury has issued guidelines and 
principles for negotiators of EAAs "which require the outlay of U.S. dollars for 
foreign currencies, the inflow of funds from foreign countries, or the exchange 
of U.S. dollars and foreign currencies."72 DOD has indicated, in DOD Instruc-
tion 7360.9, Use of United States-Owned Foreign Currencies, that the Treasury 
guidelines will be implemented. 
Several significant policy issues are addressed in the Treasury guidelines. First, 
Treasury guidelines do not permit the withdrawal of U.S. dollars prior to an 
immediate funding requirement. Consequently, an EAA calling for advance 
payments73 would be contrary to the Treasury cash management policies. Sec-
ond, interest earned on U.S. payments deposited in foreign banks may not be 
credited against U.S. obligations. Treasury is trying to keep an agency from 
reducing the amount of its payment obligation by paying early and receiving a 
price reduction. Their point is well taken, since an early payment scheme would 
transfer some of the program costs to the Treasury in the form of additional 
borrowing of money by the Treasury on the open market. With regard to 
currency exchange, Treasury suggests that agency holdings of foreign currency 
should not exceed immediate working requirements, no forward contracts for 
currency should be made, and the agencies should avoid any appearance of 
currency speculation. 
7. Indemnification by the United States of the Foreign Government 
One of the standard provisions in a foreign military sales letter of offer and 
acceptance is a statement that the foreign purchaser will reimburse the United 
States for all costs associated with the sale. In the negotiation of an EAA, termed 
by some as a reverse FMS (Foreign Munitions Sale), foreign governments often 
desire the same type of broad commitment from the United States. 
This type of broad, essentially unbounded, commitment to indemnify can only 
be made by the Department of Defense under the provisions of Public Law 
85-804 and only when the risk indemnified is "unusually hazardous or nuclear in 
nature."74 Since most acquisitions from a foreign source do not generally involve 
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks, an agency may agree only to pay such costs 
"subject to the authorization and appropriation of funds" or "subject to the 
availability offunds." An EAA containing this type oflanguage, however, may be 
72. Letter from Mr. Paul H. Taylor, Fiscal Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Mr. Fred Wacker, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (December 13, 1979). 
73. DAR Appendix E-400 .1 seq. 
74. Exec. Order 11,610, 36 Fed. Reg. 13755 (1971). 
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subject to criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO) as being a 
coercive Anti-Deficiency violation. 
In 1980, the General Accounting Office had the opportunity to review a 
proposed EAA between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) and the government of Australia for a weather modification program. 75 
NOAA had been engaged in a hurricane abatement research program for several 
years. This cooperative program with Australia involved hurricane seeding far 
off the Australian coast, with little chance of the storms reaching Australia. The 
chance of serious damage was remote. Notwithstanding this, the Australian 
government requested the United States to indemnify Australia for all damages 
arising from the hurricane seeding experiments. 
In a series of questions to the Comptroller General, the Department of State 
(who was negotiating with the Australian government on behalf of NOAA) 
noted that a complete indemnification for all damages in an indeterminate 
amount would violate the Anti-Deficiency Act. The GAO concurred, stating: 
"This office has long held that, absent specific statutory authority, indemnity 
provisions in agreements which subject the United States to contingent and 
undetermined liabilities contravene the Anti-Deficiency Act."76 
The State Department then posed two alternatives, which involved an agree-
ment by the United States to pay damages, subject to the appropriation of funds 
by Congress. In response, the Comptroller General stated: 
These proposals are subject to essentially the same Anti-Deficiency 
Act objection as is the full indemnity proposal. While in the propos-
als embodied in questions 1 and 3, the liability to pay is still contin-
gent and the amount of the damages is still indefinite, it could be 
argued that no violation would occur should NOAA agree to either 
indemnification arrangement because no obligation will arise unless 
or until the Congress makes an adequate appropriation for its 
fulfillment. We concede that an agreement which makes it clear that 
the United States is in no way obligated to make future payments 
should a contingent event occur unless the Congress chooses to 
appropriate funds for such payments does not violate the letter of the 
Anti-Deficiency Act. However, we think it violates its spirit. 77 
After discussing and rejecting numerous variations of the State Department's 
"subject to" theme, the Comptroller General finally accepted an insurance 
scheme in which the United States and Australia would share equally the cost of 
an insurance policy covering the risk. The GAO stated: 
It is true that the United States Government has a longstanding 
75. Project Stormfury - Australia - Indemnification for Damages, 59 Comp. Gen. 369, B-198206 (1980). 
76. Id. at 3. 
77. Id. at 3-4. 
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policy that it will insure itself against its own risks. Absent express 
statutory authority, funds supporting Government activities gener-
ally cannot be applied to the purchase of insurance to cover loss of or 
damage to Government property. 19 Compo Gen. 798, 800 (1940); 
39 id. 145, 147 (1959). Here, however, the insurance is not for the 
purpose of protecting against a risk to which the United States would 
be exposed as a result of participating in the project. Rather, it is the 
price exacted by this Government's partner in an international ven-
ture to protect its interests. In this view, the insurance premium, with 
Australia as a beneficiary, is merely one of the costs of the United 
States' participation in this project for which any appropriation 
NOAA receives for this purpose would be available. It should be 
expliitly provided that the United States' liability under the agree-
ment is limited to its share of the insurance premiums. 78 
In summary, any indefinite agreement to pay costs or damages "subject to the 
appropriation of funds" is clearly subject to criticism from the GAO and should 
be avoided, if at all possible, during negotiations with the foreign government. 
8. Resolution of Disputes 
Because of the sovereign nature of the parties to an EAA, the normal practice 
is to include a provision in the agreement stating that disputes under the EAA 
will not be referred to a third party for arbitration or resolution. Consequently, 
any ensuing country-to-country disagreements must be resolved by the nations 
through the negotiation process. DAR 1-314(e) specifically provides that: "A 
contract with a foreign government or agency thereof, or with an international 
organization or subsidiary body thereof, may be exempted from the Act and 
from DAR 1-314 if the Secretary determines that application of the Contract 
Disputes Act to the contract would not be in the public interest." 
Since the United States has no privity of contract with the foreign manufac-
turer, all disputes must be resolved by the u.se of the dispute resolution process 
of the foreign government. Familiarity with the system used by the foreign 
government will be necessary for those actually administering the EAA. 
9. Legislative Initiatives: NATO Standardization and Interoperability 
One of the best ways to achieve standardization and interoperability is to use 
the same basic technology in the development of weapon systems. U.S. policy 
concerning NATO standardization and interoperability is contained in the 
"Culver-Nunn" amendment to the FY 1977 DOD Appropriation Authorization 
Act,79 which provides: 
78. ld. at 6-7. 
79. Pub. L. No. 94-361, §§ 802, 803, 90 Stat. 923 (1976). 
1984] TECHNOLOGY FROM A FOREIGN GoVERNMENT 
[I]t is the policy of the United States that equipment procured for 
the use of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States 
stationed in Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty 
should be standardized or at least interoperable with equipment of 
other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiation .... 
[T]he Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible extent 
initiate and carry out procurement procedures that provide for the 
acquisition of equipment which is standardized or interoperable .... 
Whenever the Secretary of Defense determines that it is necessary in 
order to carry out this policy . . . to procure equipment manufac-
tured outside the United States, he is authorized to determine for 
the purpose of [the Buy American Act] that the acquisition of such 
equipment manufactured in the United States is inconsistent with 
the public interest. 80 
351 
As the above quotation indicates, the Secretary of Defense may waive the Buy 
American ActSl to procure standardized or interoperable equipment. Also, a 
report to Congress is required on programs which do not further the Amend-
ment's policy.82 Under this authority, the DOD has entered into numerous 
general reciprocal procurement memoranda which waive the Buy American Act. 
DAR 6-1406 contains copies of these memoranda. 
The sense of Congress is contained in Section 803 of P.L. 94-361, which 
encourages weapons development to meet common NATO requirements and 
the use of negotiated agreements to facilitate the achievement of coordinated 
arms development and production programs. 83 Congress apparently believes 
that cooperation with NATO allies in weapon development aid production is a 
viable means to meet the Soviet challenge. 
Even though the Culver-Nunn Amendment is permanent legislation, there is 
some evidence that it is not welf understood by those in the executive branch of 
government charged with its implementation. As shown by the enactment of the 
Culver-Nunn Amendment, Congress is clearly on record with its support for 
cooperative NATO programs. The executive branch, however, has not fully 
implemented this policy in its current defense programs. The amendment is one 
of the driving forces behind the movement toward the use of EAAs to achieve 
standardization and interoperability. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The acquisition of foreign technology by the U.S. government through the use 
of an EAA may become far more than just another new acquisition method. It is 
!!O. ld. § 802(a)(1). 
81. 41 U.S.C. § lO(a) (1982). 
82. Pub. L. No:94-361, § 802(a)(3), 90 Stat. 9'23. 
83. ld. § 803(b). 
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being used as an important foreign policy tool by the Reagan administration. 
The purchase of foreign technology benefits both the foreign country, which 
receives compensation for the information, and the United States, which does 
not have to develop the acquired technology. 
This paper is the first step toward a more complete understanding of the legal 
and political implications of using an executive agreement to acquire defense 
related technology. If the Department of Defense desires to use EAAs to acquire 
technology, it should develop a more standard procedural path for the three 
services to use. Many of the "lessons learned" during international negotiations 
are not passed along to the other services in an orderly fashion. 
Serious consideration should be given to a separate DAR section covering 
EAA acquisition and, possibly, to creation of a small, DOD-level organization to 
negotiate the agreements. This organization would be staffed with personnel 
from each of the military departments, much like the DAR Council. Close 
cooperation and a concentration of talent should result in EAAs more beneficial 
to the United States. 
